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Recently, through no fault of ours, one of us 
became involved in a formal debate on the 
following motion: ‘Th is house believes that 
the engineers who design lethal autonomous 
and semi-autonomous systems must accept 
ultimate responsibility for the ethical 
behaviour of those systems.’ In the fi nal vote, 
this motion was accepted.  However, it seemed 
that we could also have inserted ‘ergonomists’ 
in place of ‘engineers’. For this reason, we 
pass on some of the thinking. First, let’s set 
the scene, and then discuss two scenarios. 
What do we mean by ‘lethal’? Th e debate 
was about military robots deployed in the 
battlespace with weapons and programmed to 
kill, given the right circumstances. However, 
the discussion could also apply to ‘peaceful’ 
robots that can kill inadvertently.
What do we mean by ‘autonomy’? Th e essence 
of autonomy is that the robot has both the 
capability to make its own decisions, and has 
access to resources to enable to carry out its 
decisions.  Th ere are degrees of autonomy:
1. Th e computer off ers no assistance; 
humans must do it all.
2. Th e computer off ers a complete set of 
action alternatives,
3. and narrows the selection down to a few,
4. or suggests one,
5. and executes that suggestion if the human 
approves,
6. or allows the human a restricted time to 
veto before automatic execution,
7. or executes automatically, then necessarily 
informs the human,
8. or informs the human after execution only 
if it is asked,
9. or informs the human after execution if 
the computer decides to do so.
10. Th e computer decides everything and 
acts autonomously, ignoring the human
Given that these robots will be in the armed 
services, they will be within a hierarchy of 
control. Hence, we need two other dimensions. 
Firstly, what autonomy is allocated to the 
robot (e.g. it can kill over there, but not here, 
and over there it must follow the Rules of 
Engagement). Secondly, there is the amount 
of time for which the robot is allowed to 
be autonomous (the less the time, the less 
the damage the robot can do). Finally, it is 
likely that a robot’s allowable or acceptable 
autonomy will be aff ected by the weapons 
it carries. If it is armed with a pea-shooter, 
nobody will worry much about its level of 
autonomy. If it has a nuclear weapon on 
board, we might be very concerned.
What is ethical behaviour? In essence, in a 
war situation the basis of ethical behaviour 
is provided by the Law of Armed Confl ict 
(LOAC) in tandem with the Rules of 
Engagement that apply to a particular 
confl ict. LOAC does not specify that decision 
making in the battlespace must be carried out 
by humans; therefore, if decisions leading to 
intentional death are made, it does not seem 
to matter whether this process is undertaken 
by humans or machines. LOAC is emphatic 
about the requirement for military necessity, 
the proper discrimination of targets and non-
targets, proportionality in the use of fi repower, 
and the embodiment of the principles of 
humanity in decisions.
Who has ‘ultimate’ responsibility? Note 
that ‘ultimate’ does not imply ‘total’; merely 
that you are fundamentally implicated. Your 
responsibility could become total if the robot 
that you have designed has the capability to 
understand unethical or illegal commands, 
and is capable of refusing to enact them. But 
ou will hardly be held responsible if the robot 
has been given imperfect information.
Learning! Th is is a big problem. Autonomous 
systems in general, not just robots, need to be 
given the capability to learn, so that they can 
learn from their mistakes and can become 
more profi cient in the range of environments 
in which they function. So how do we 
ensure that our robot learns nothing that is 
unethical? Are we responsible if it does, since 
we have given it its learning capability? Let’s 
consider two examples.
Example 1. Energetically Autonomous 
Tactical Robot (EATR), a DARPA-funded 
prototype developed in the USA. It’s “able 
to perform long-range, long-endurance 
missions without the need for manual 
or conventional re-fueling, which would 
otherwise preclude the ability of the robot 
to perform such missions”. Th at’s because it’s 
designed to live off  the land, off  biomass, like 
a goat or a sheep. It gathers food by means 
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of a gripper and a chainsaw and pops it in a 
hopper on top. It then produces electricity to 
power itself. So in principle it could be sent 
off  into lower Helmand, armed, to patrol the 
border with Pakistan. Th ey say that it needs 
up to 70 kg of dry mass per day for full roving 
functionality. Compare this to a sheep, which 
needs up to 2kg dry mass per day. Sheep 
spend 5-10 hours per day feeding, depending 
on the quality of the food so the EATR could 
spend most of its time in Helmand roaming 
for food. And this raises some ethical issues. 
Suppose it comes across an old fence.  LOAC 
says that civilian artefacts shall be left alone. 
Suppose the robot fi nds a Taliban corpse 
out there, after an airstrike. Assuming the 
body is fully clothed, behold! dry food, albeit 
wrapped round a corpse. What happens next? 
LOAC is very specifi c about not desecrating 
the dead, so whether the robot does anything 
may depend on its powers of discrimination. 
In such a scenario, it’s diffi  cult to see that the 
robot’s commander would be held responsible 
for what the robot did, unethically, more likely 
it’s those who designed and maintained it.
Example 2. US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (adapted from an example 
in Wallach & Allen). It’s morning in 
America, on May 2nd, 2015 and it’s the fi rst 
really hot and humid day of the year. Th e 
electricity producers have decided to start 
up some old, coal-fi red plants to meet the 
expected demand for air conditioning. It’s 
09.15 and one of the plants near New York 
has a turbine problem, followed by a small 
explosion and the plant goes into emergency 
shut-down, resulting in a few areas having a 
power black-out. Th e DHS computers receive 
this information (explosion; shut-down; 
blackouts) and deduce there’s a possibility it’s 
due to terrorist action. Th en,  due to another 
unrelated incident - a small aircraft hitting an 
electricity pylon in Illinois - the computers 
decide to raise the security threat level. At 
Reagan Airport near Washington DC the 
security computers, scanning passengers’ 
biometric data, tighten their criteria in the 
light of the raised security level. Th ey detect 
that fi ve passengers going to London and 
on to Karachi should be re-inspected, but 
the fl ight is boarding, so armed security 
guards rush along and grab them. Th ere’s a 
scuffl  e and a gun is fi red. It’s 09.20 when the 
DHS computers learn of this and upgrade 
the threat level again. Meanwhile in Texas, 
there are autonomous weapons, connected to 
the DHS computers, mounted back from a 
fence running along the border to deal with 
drug-smuggling. Th ese have ‘stop and desist’ 
signs connected to them. In an empty part 
of the state, one of these weapons detects a 
Hummer coming out of the desert and lights 
up its ‘stop’ sign. Th e Hummer stops, and this 
being Texas, someone leans out and shoots 
the sign. Because of the high threat level 
the autonomous weapon immediately fi res 
in response, and the Hummer is destroyed. 
It’s 09.25. While LOAC itself does not apply 
to this situation, its principles are still valid. 
Th e Hummer victims died as a result of an 
over-reaction by a computerised system-of-
systems, in disregard of LOAC principles. 
Of course, there will be humans within this 
system of systems, nominally in charge, and 
able to over-rule the decisions. But they 
will only do this with secondary, confi rming 
evidence, because nobody will want to risk 
saying “It’s all OK”, and then fi nd they really 
are dealing with a terrorist incident. Th is 
takes time, and the whole scenario could 
be over before they have confi rmation. In 
this system of systems, it is likely that the 
diff erent components were developed by 
diff erent organisations and brought into 
interoperation at diff erent times by diff erent 
people, not necessarily aware of what other 
changes are or have been happening in the 
system-of-systems.  Hence, even though you 
may not be working on lethal autonomous 
systems, if they can be connected to your 
work, you may have to consider the ethical 
issues of what you are creating.
So where does this leave us?
Autonomous systems necessarily must  ♦
embody ethics in their design, development 
and operation. Th is is particularly the case 
for intentionally-lethal systems, and is likely 
to be true for those that could kill or maim 
inadvertently. In a system-of-systems context, 
ethical considerations will be spread across 
the whole network of systems.
We don’t yet know how to embody ethics  ♦
in an autonomous system, especially if they 
are given the capability to learn. Given 
an ethics disaster, it’s likely that both the 
controllers of these autonomous systems and 
their developers will be queried in a court 
of inquiry as to their responsibility for the 
disaster. To the extent that ergonomists are 
involved in both of these domains, we might 
be present, too.
We might have identifi ed another  ♦
interface between humans and machines; the 
ethics interface.  If we have, then we need to 
understand it.  Th is is a next generation issue 
and this means you! ?
